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Abstract
This paper evaluates the performance of the Friedman rule and
characterizes efficient allocation of resources within a new-generation,
search-theoretic model of monetary union with divisibility and degen-
erate distribution of money holdings. The main results are: i) the
Friedman rule is a necessary and sufficient condition for global effi-
ciency, and ii) the Friedman rule is necessary for local efficiency, as it
is the unique policy rule that eliminates the hold-up problem in any
local market. It is also shown that the efficient quantity demanded
by a country-i buyer is increasing, and the country-i price of goods
is decreasing, in the country-i fraction of sellers. (JEL Classification:
D83, E40, E50 ).
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1 Introduction
This paper evaluates the performance of the Friedman rule and character-
izes efficient allocation of resources within a new-generation, search-theoretic
model of monetary union with divisibility and degenerate distribution of
money holdings.
Previous works on this topic have shown that a rate of growth of money
that obeys the Friedman rule may or may not guarantee efficiency.1 The
Friedman rule generates the first-best allocation in the Shi’s [17] households
model, whereas it only achieves the second-best in Lagos and Wright [13]
(hereafter, LW), unless eithrt buyers have all the bargaining power or agents
are price takers in the decentralized trade market (see [15], [16]).2
In their analysis, LW assume a unique decentralized market, which in
turn implies a unique strategy across agent-types (i.e. buyers, sellers). This
paper extends their setup by assuming that two disjoint groups of agents
participate in two distinct decentralized local markets before they can re-
balance their money holdings in the centralized market; it turns out that
agents of the same type may have different strategies if trading conditions
differ across local markets. This in turn permits to study the behavior of
prices and efficiency in a two-country monetary union.
The main results are: i) the Friedman rule is a necessary and sufficient
condition for global efficiency, and ii) the Friedman rule is necessary for local
efficiency, as it is the unique policy rule that eliminates the hold-up problem
in any local market. It is also shown that the efficient quantity demanded by
a country-i buyer is increasing, and the country-i price of goods is decreasing,
in the country-i fraction of sellers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3
present and extend the LW model. Equilibria are characterized in Section 4.
Section 5 describes results. Section 5 ends the paper with a brief summary.
1Inefficiencies associated with search frictions have been analyzed in literature by [1],
[5], [7], [13], [14], [15], and [16].
2The Shi and LW frameworks use different framework to obtain a degenerate distribu-
tion of money. For a detailed discussion of the two approaches see [12].
2
2 The model
The framework of analysis is taken from LW. Time is discrete and tends
to infinity. There is a [0, 1] continuum of agents and one perishable good
that can be produced and consumed. The economy consists of two countries
labelled i ∈ {1, 2}. Let αi be the fraction of total population living in country
i. Each period is divided into two subperiods, morning and afternoon. In the
morning, agents living in country i trade bilaterally in a decentralized market,
called local market i, while in the afternoon trade occurs in a centralized and
frictionless market open to all agents regardless of their nationality; this
market is called international market.
When the local market starts, agents are subject to a preference shock
such that they can either consume or produce as follows. With probability
1 − ni an agent of country i can consume but cannot produce, while with
probability ni the agent can produce but cannot consume.
3 We refer to
consumers as buyers, and to producers as sellers. Agents get utility u (q)
from q units of consumption in the local market, with u′ (q) > 0, u′′ (q) < 0,
u′ (0) = ∞, and u′ (∞) = 0. Furthermore, we assume that the elasticity of
utility e (q) = qu′ (q) /u (q) is bounded. Producers incur a utility cost c (q)
from producing q units of output, with c′ (q) > 0, c′′ (q) > 0, c′ (0) = 0
and c′ (∞) = ∞. Let q∗ denote the solution to u′ (q∗) = c′ (q∗). To make
money essential, it is assumed that buyers in the local market are anonymous.
Consequently, trading histories of agents are private information and trades
are subject to a quid pro quo restriction ([9], [18]).
In the international market all agents consume and produce, getting
utility U (x) from x units of consumption, with U ′ (x) > 0, U ′ (0) = ∞,
U ′ (∞) = 0 and U ′′ (x) ≤ 0. Let x∗ be the solution to U ′ (x∗) = 1. All agents
can produce consumption goods from labor using a linear technology. This
implies that all agents of a given type will chose to carry the same amount
of money out of the international market, independent of their trading his-
tory. Agents discount between afternoon and the next-period morning but
not between morning and afternoon. This is not restrictive since as in [16]
all that matters is the total discounting between one period and the next.
Let the quantity of money at time t be Mt > 0 and assume Mt = γMt−1,
where γ > 0 is constant and new money is injected in case γ > 1, or with-
3Some recent attempts to endogenize the fraction of agents entering in the market
include [7], [10], [14], [15], and [17].
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drawn if γ < 1, as lump-sum transfers δMt−1 = (γ − 1)Mt−1 to all buyers
at the start of local market. To guarantee existence of a unique steady-state
monetary equilibrium, γ is restricted to be larger than the discount fac-
tor β ∈ (0, 1). Let δbMt−1 = δMt−1/
∑2
i=1 αi (1− ni) denote the per buyer
money transfer. In order to use a convenient notation, the time subscript t
is omitted and t+ 1 is shortened to +1, etc . . .
In period t, let φ = 1/P be the real price of money and P the price of
goods in the international market. Consider a stationary monetary equilib-
rium where aggregate real money balances are time invariant,
φM = φ−1M−1 (1)
which implies that φ−1/φ = M/M−1 = γ.
Let V (m1) be the expected value from trading in the local market with
m1 money balances conditional on the aggregate shock. Let W (m2) denote
the expected value from entering the international market with m2 units of
money.
3 The Period
In what follows, we look at a representative period t and work backwards
from the afternoon to the morning market.
3.1 Afternoon
In the afternoon agents produce h goods (equal labor supply), consume x, and
adjust their money balances. The representative country-i agent’s problem
is
Wi (m2) = max
x,h,m1,+1
[U (x)− h+ βVi (m1,+1)] (2)
such that
x+ φm1,+1 = h+ φm2 (3)
where h are hours of work, m1,+1 is the money taken into period t + 1, and
φ is the price of money in terms of goods. Substituting h from (3) into (2)
yields
Wi (m2) = φm2 + max
x,m1,+1
[U (x)− x− φm1,+1 + βVi (m1,+1)] . (4)
4
By strict concavity of U (x) the maximizing choice of x is x∗ where U ′ (x∗) =
1; the maximizing choice of m1,+1 is obtained by the first order condition
φ = βV ′ (m1,+1) (5)
where the left hand side of (5) is the marginal cost of taking money out of
the international market (φ) and the right hand side is the marginal benefit
(βV ′ (m1,+1)). Competitive markets (i.e., under price taking) and u′′ (q) < 0
are sufficient for uniqueness of m1,+1, hence all buyers in the international
market choose the same m1,+1.
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Notice that the optimal choice of x is the same across time for all agents,
and that m1,+1 is independent of m2. As a result, the distribution of money
holdings is degenerate at the subsequent of the following period. This is due
to the quasi-linearity assumption in (2), which eliminates the wealth effects
on money demand in the international market.
The envelope condition is
Wmi = φ. (6)
Let qbi and qsi denote the quantities consumed by a buyer and produced
by a seller trading in local market i, respectively. Let pi be the nominal price
of goods in this market.
3.2 Morning
An agent living in country i with m1 unit of money at the opening of local
market has expected lifetime utility
Vi (m1) = (1− ni) [u (qbi) +Wi (m1 + δbM−1 − piqbi)]
+ni [−c (qsi) +Wi (m1 + piqsi)] (7)
where piqbi is the amount of money spent as a buyer, and piqsi the money
received as a seller.
Once the production and consumption shocks occur, agents become either
a buyer or a seller. If a country-i agent is a seller in the morning, his problem
is
max
qsi
[−c (qsi) +Wi (m1 + piqsi)] . (8)
4See [13] and [16] for a characterization under bargaining and price posting, respectively.
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The first-order condition is
−c′ (qsi) + piWmi = 0 (9)
which, using (5), reduces to
c′ (qsi) = piφ. (10)
Sellers produce an amount such that the ratio of marginal costs across mar-
kets (c′ (qsi)) is equal to the relative price (piφ) of goods across markets. Due
to the linearity of the envelope condition, qsi is independent of m1. Conse-
quently, sellers produce the same amount no matter how much money they
hold.
If a country-i agent is a buyer in the morning, his problem is:
max
qbi
[u (qbi) +Wi (m1 + δbM−1 − piqbi)] (11)
such that
piqbi ≤ m1 + δbM−1 (12)
where (12) means that buyers cannot spend more money than what they
bring into the local market, m1, plus the transfer δbM−1. The buyers’ first
order conditions are
u′ (qbi)− piWmi − λipi = 0 (13)
and
λi (m1 + δbM−1 − piqbi) = 0 (14)
where λi is the multiplier on the cash constraint for country-i buyers. The
price pi adjusts to clear the local market i, so in equilibrium
(1− ni) qbi = niqsi. (15)
Using (6), (10), (13) and (15) the buyers first order condition reduces to
u′ (qbi) =
(
1 +
λi
φ
)
c′
(
1− ni
ni
qbi
)
(16)
whereas efficiency in country i is achieved at the quantity qbi = q
∗
bi solving
u′ (q∗bi) = c
′
(
1− ni
ni
q∗bi
)
. (17)
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4 Results
Differentiating (7) gets the (indirect) marginal value of money of country-i
agents
V ′i (m1) = (1− ni)
[
u′ (qbi)
dqbi
dm1
+Wmi
(
1− pi dqbi
dm1
)]
+ni
[
−c′ (qsi) dqsi
dm1
Wmi
(
1 + pi
dqsi
dm1
)]
(18)
which, using expressions (6) and (15) , and noting that the quantity produced
by a seller does not depend on the money he holds (i.e. dqsi
dm1
= 0), can be
rewritten as
V ′i (m1) = φ
(1− ni)

 u′ (qbi)
c′
(
1−ni
ni
qbi
) − 1
 dqbi
dm1
pi + 1
+ ni
 . (19)
Using, (1) and (5) lagged one period to eliminate V ′i (m1) from (19) one
obtains
γ − β
β
= (1− ni)
 u′ (qbi)
c′
(
1−ni
ni
qbi
) − 1
 . (20)
The next lemma establishes the relationship between the efficient quantity
of goods demanded by country-i buyers and the country-i fraction of sellers.
Proposition 1 The efficient quantity demanded by a country-i buyer is in-
creasing in the country-i fraction of sellers.
Proof. Taking the differential of (17) yields
u′′ (q∗bi) dq
∗
bi = c
′′
(
1− ni
ni
q∗bi
)
1− ni
ni
dq∗bi − c′′
(
1− ni
ni
q∗bi
)
q∗bi
n2i
dni (21)
or, rearranging,[
c′′
(
1− ni
ni
q∗bi
)
1− ni
ni
− u′′ (q∗bi)
]
dq∗bi =
q∗bi
n2i
c′′
(
1− ni
ni
q∗bi
)
dni (22)
which implies
dq∗bi
dni
=
q∗bic
′′
(
1−ni
ni
q∗bi
)
ni
[
(1− ni) c′′
(
1−ni
ni
q∗bi
)
− niu′′ (q∗bi)
] > 0 (23)
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by concavity of u (q) and convexity of c (q).
This result shows that, when the local market i is thinner for buyers (that
is ni is smaller), market clearing condition implies a lower buyer’s demand
of the good. This is because, under price taking, the aggregate demand is
equal to the aggregate production in equilibrium.
Next we establish a parallel result regarding the dynamics of prices in
country i.
Proposition 2 The country-i price of goods is decreasing in the country-i
fraction of sellers.
Proof. Substituting qsi into (10) from (15) and taking the differential yields
c′′
(
1− ni
ni
qbi
)
1− ni
ni
dqbi − qbi
n2i
c′′
(
1− ni
ni
qbi
)
dni = φdpi (24)
then differentiating (13) gets
u′′ (qbi) dqbi = φdpi (25)
unless the country-i buyers’ constraint is binding. Using (25) to eliminate
dqbi into (24) yields
c′′
(
1− ni
ni
qbi
)
φ (1− ni)
niu′′ (qbi)
dpi − qbi
n2i
c′′
(
1− ni
ni
qbi
)
dni = φdpi
which implies
dpi
dni
=
qbic
′′
(
1−ni
ni
qbi
)
u′′ (qbi)
niφ
[
(1− ni) c′′
(
1−ni
ni
qbi
)
− niu′′ (qbi)
] < 0 (26)
by concavity of u (q) and convexity of c (q).
Proposition 3 Asymmetric fraction of sellers across countries is a neces-
sary and sufficient condition for prices and the efficient quantity of good
demanded by buyers to be asymmetric across local markets.
Proof. (Sufficiency.) Assume the fraction of sellers is asymmetric across
countries, i.e. ni 6= nj, i 6= j where i, j ∈ {1, 2}. Then, directly from (23)
and (26), this implies
q∗bi 6= q∗bj
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and
pi 6= pj
respectively.
(Necessity.) Assume q∗bi 6= q∗bj and pi 6= pj, i 6= j where i, j ∈ {1, 2}. Then
using (23) and (26) it holds that ni 6= nj.
5 Equilibria
This section characterizes equilibria in which efficiency is attained in either
or both countries.
5.1 Global efficiency
Let the term global efficiency denote a stationary monetary equilibrium in
which efficiency is attained in both countries, i.e. qbi = q
∗
bi for any i ∈ {1, 2}.
We now state our first main result.
Proposition 4 A global efficiency equilibrium is a necessary and sufficient
condition for the marginal value of money to be equal to its marginal cost
across countries.
Proof. (Sufficiency.) Assume a global efficiency equilibrium holds, i.e. qbi =
q∗bi for any i ∈ {1, 2}. Then, expression (19) reduces to V ′i (m1) = φ for any
i ∈ {1, 2} .
(Necessity.) Assume the marginal value of money is equal to its marginal
cost across countries, i.e. V ′i (m1) = φ for any i ∈ {1, 2} . This is equivalent
to the system of equations
V ′i (m1) = φ
{
(1− ni)
[
u′(qbi)
c′
(
1−ni
ni
qbi
) − 1
]
+ ni
}
,
u′ (qbi) = c′
(
1−ni
ni
qbi
) (27)
which, by virtue of (16)-(17) , is satisfied if and only if qbi = q
∗
bi for any
i ∈ {1, 2} .
The meaning of Proposition 4 is the following. Under global efficiency,
real balances are maximized across countries. This means that the country-i
marginal value of taking an additional unit of money into the local market-i
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V ′i (m1) is equal to its marginal cost (φ) which is a constant. So, the marginal
value of money must be the same across local markets.
We now derive a sufficient and necessary condition for global efficiency.
Proposition 5 The Friedman rule is a necessary and sufficient condition
for global efficiency.
Proof. (Sufficiency.) Assume that the economy is at the Friedman rule, i.e.
γ = β. Using (20) , this implies
(1− ni)
 u′ (qbi)
c′
(
1−ni
ni
qbi
) − 1
 = 0. (28)
which implies
u′ (qbi)
c′
(
1−ni
ni
qbi
) = 1,
hence, using (17) , qbi = q
∗
bi for any i ∈ {1, 2}.
(Necessity.) Assume global efficiency, i.e. qbi = q
∗
bi for any i ∈ {1, 2}.
Replacing qbi into (20) with q
∗
bi and using (17) yields γ = β.
By Proposition 5, global efficiency is attained if and only if the money
growth rate obeys the Friedman rule. The reason for this result is that,
when agents are price takers and the Friedman rule is implemented, there
is no hold-up problem, which makes the buyers’ cash constraint non-binding
across countries and so the quantity of good traded is efficient.
5.2 Local efficiency
Local efficiency is meant to be an equilibrium in which efficiency is attained
in at least one country, i.e. qbi = q
∗
bi for at least one i ∈ {1, 2}.
The next result establishes that the Friedman rule is necessary for local
efficiency.
Proposition 6 The Friedman rule is a necessary condition for local effi-
ciency.
Proof. Assume both that the Friedman rule is not implemented, γ 6= β, and
local efficiency holds, i.e. qbi = q
∗
bi for at least one i ∈ {1, 2}, let this be i = 1.
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It follows from (17) that
u′ (qb1)
c′
(
1−n1
n1
qb1
) = 1, (29)
which implies
(1− n1)
 u′ (qb1)
c′
(
1−n1
n1
qb1
) − 1
 = 0 (30)
Substitution of (20) into (30) gives γ − β = 0. This gives a contradiction,
and shows that local efficiency implies the Friedman rule γ = β.
6 Conclusions
This paper analyzed the relationship between the Friedman rule and efficient
allocations of resources within a new-generation, search-theoretic model of
monetary union with divisibility and degenerate distribution of money hold-
ings.
The main results are: i) the Friedman rule is a necessary and sufficient
condition for global efficiency, and ii) the Friedman rule is necessary for local
efficiency, as it is the unique policy rule that eliminates the hold-up problem
in any local market. It is also shown that the efficient quantity demanded by
a country-i buyer is increasing, and the country-i price of goods is decreasing,
in the country-i fraction of sellers.
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